Why Karnataka’s political identity might depend entirely on JDS
I’ve quizzed multiple Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) politicians about why no individual BJP chief minister has ever served a full, uninterrupted five-year term despite the party completing a full-term legislative assembly tenure twice in Karnataka. No two persons have given the same answer, largely because Karnataka BJP’s situation has many moving parts, including the swaying Lingayat voter base, amorphous minority representation, and brazen insubordination, each forming a complex relationship with the other.
If you insist upon a single definitive answer, a few BJP ideologues have no qualms in attributing the party’s resounding defeat in the 2023 assembly elections to factionalism, which they believe lends itself well to the electoral calculations of the Indian National Congress (INC). The state BJP’s internal fault lines have visibly widened since, much to the dismay of the party’s central high command.
However, with Janata Dal Secular (JDS) joining the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) in September 2023, the political equation for the upcoming 2028 assembly elections has fewer variables. Unlike in 2007 when the power-sharing agreement between BJP and JDS collapsed under the weight of personal ambitions and eroded trust, the recent alliance is moulded by BJP’s contextual awareness, JDS’ existential battle, and their shared disdain for INC.
Before allying with the BJP, former prime minister and current JDS chief H. D. Deve Gowda proclaimed that this coalition was essential to save the party¹. His sentiment finds rationale in JDS’ assembly seats that plummeted from 37 in the 2018 elections to 19 in 2023. JDS state president H. D. Kumaraswamy, who subsequently became a union minister in the NDA government, has since stood steadfast in his commitment to the coalition cause, most recently offering full support to the three landmark bills introduced in Lok Sabha². So, if the genie of opportunism is back in the bottle, will the BJP-JDS alliance withstand the vagaries of modern politics in the run-up to the 2028 elections?
BJP has a perception problem in Karnataka
INC is navigating an unprecedented anti-incumbency wave in Karnataka, especially among the undecided voter base lingering outside the confines of sectarianism and identity politics, largely due to the untenable economics of its welfare-driven “go-go” populism. INC is also grappling with dissension among Muslim cadres, whose unconditional support is the foremost determinant of its electoral success in Karnataka.
However, that simmering dissension is unlikely to translate into defection and benefit the BJP, as evident from the INC’s hard-fought victory in recent by-elections in Bagalkot and Davanagere South.
According to Janapatha’s analysis, the inapplicability of a “zero-sum game” here—INC’s loss not translating to BJP’s gain—boils down to a perception problem that BJP has yet to seriously address in Karnataka.
BJP formed a mandate-driven stable government on its own for the first time in South India, in Karnataka, in 2008, promising a farmer-friendly budget and gynocentric schemes like ‘Bhagyalakshmi.’ The populist undertones in its electoral promises, paired with cadre-oriented party structure, enabled the BJP to cement its position in Karnataka’s sociopolitical discourse. At that stage, its agenda wasn’t on a collision course with the state’s deeply entrenched nativism.
After the BJP formed the central government in 2014 and began fostering a high-command culture, the state unit’s carefully crafted perception of being an antithesis to the INC’s centralization became debatable. JDS, which was losing its traditional Vokkaliga voter base in the old Mysuru region (cynosure of Kannada-identity politics), and the INC were quick in stoking the dormant “mother tongue-first” sentiments and ascribing an anti-federalism tag to the BJP.
The anti-compulsion stance, particularly about the imposition of Hindi, remains a divide that the BJP has yet to bridge with Karnataka voters. The party’s local leaders have largely embraced the policy of deliberate ambiguity on the subject, in what can be perceived as a tacit reluctance to assert regional autonomy.
Why JDS can bridge that divide
Owing to INC’s historical precedents at the centre, Karnataka voters are just as disillusioned with the incumbent INC state government’s purported “Karnataka-first” stance as they are with the BJP’s high command-driven politics. However, it may not be akin to a “caught-between-a-rock-and-a-hard-place” situation for voters if the JDS-BJP alliance remains solidified as ever in the run-up to 2028. If JDS has not lost one thing in Karnataka, it is its perception of being a staunch advocate of the pro-Kannada cause.
According to Janapatha’s meta-analysis of various surveys, at least 36% of voters in Karnataka believe JDS to be a proponent of the pro-Karnataka cause, whereas the corresponding figures for BJP and INC are 20% and 28%, respectively. That perception adds an interesting dimension to polling patterns that are being increasingly shaped by sectarianism. For undecided voters, particularly those incentivized by the prospect of “double-engine” governance, JDS could be perceived as an insurance to vote for the BJP. The question remains: What factors is this “accountability insurance” contingent on?
H. D. Kumaraswamy has recently predicted that JDS would win 75–80 seats in the 2028 elections³—about 4X the party’s tally from 2023. This projection is a strategic political overture, in that it not only places the ball of seat sharing in the BJP’s court but also induces a sense of urgency for pre-poll preparations. That urgency stems from H. D. Kumaraswamy’s anticipation of potential dissension that the BJP and JDS have to address exclusively while sharing seats. The prospect of delimitation and special intensive revision (SIR) further complicates the seat-sharing dynamics.
In any case, for JDS to realize H. D. Kumaraswamy’s ambitions, with coalition or otherwise, it may have to take a leaf out of TVK’s playbook from the recent Tamil Nadu assembly elections. TVK leveraged the ‘Overton window’ for an alternative beyond the DMK-AIDMK binary, outmanoeuvring the BJP’s plans to do the same. BJP underestimated the precedence that linguistic chauvinism takes over sectarianism in Tamil Nadu—a sentiment that could manifest in Karnataka to some extent in 2028.
However, TVK’s political “image” building, achieved through concerted “phygital” campaigns, is not seamlessly scalable in Karnataka due to deeply ingrained preconceived notions about potential chief minister candidates. Among those in the fray, and with Siddaramaiah increasingly unlikely to be a frontrunner in 2028, only JDS’ H. D. Kumaraswamy and INC’s D. K. Shivakumar carry scope for the politics of “image.” The headwinds of anti-incumbency largely affect the latter.
For the Karnataka BJP’s part, factionalism stemming from dynastic experiments, past grievances, and caste calculations continues to hinder the solidification of B. Y. Vijayendra’s leadership. Despite minor electoral setbacks under his tenure in recent years, the high command remains understandably bullish due to his balanced disposition, good rapport with JDS, and deep grassroots connect, especially in Lingayat-predominant North Karnataka. If BJP-JDS can iron out the seat-sharing details without imploding, B. Y. Vijayendra and H. D. Kumaraswamy are just as well-positioned to solve the caste conundrum as they are to bridge the BJP’s divide with Karnataka’s nativist sentiments.
Practical pathways for JDS: Sampoorna Kranti 2.0
Throughout his political career, H. D. Deve Gowda has consistently revered “Lok Nayak” Jayaprakash Narayan (JP), emphasizing the foundational impact of the latter’s “Sampoorna Kranti” (total revolution) principles on his ideology. An enduring testament to that admiration is the name of JDS’ national headquarters in Bengaluru: JP Bhavan.
Today, as JDS stands at the crossroads of its political legacy following consecutive electoral setbacks and a high-profile scandal that sent ripples across the country, the need to revisit its roots and founding principles is greater than ever, especially in the context of JP’s unfettered belief in grassroots democracy and decentralization. The party leadership must essentially reinforce the ‘Janata’ and ‘Secular’ elements in JDS by advocating for people-centred governance and pluralism.
This strategic imperative is seemingly not lost on JDS’ youth president Nikhil Kumaraswamy, who recently stated that the party’s secular values were intact despite its alliance with the BJP.⁴ The repositioning of the party’s public perception lends itself well to the broader voter volatility and political flux stemming from INC’s internal dissension and, more recently, the unceremonious ouster of Siddaramaiah, whose sway over populist and “AHINDA” voters (approximately 65–70% of Karnataka’s population, consisting of minorities, backward classes, and Dalits) remains as strong as ever.
JDS’ potential revival also takes a geographical dimension. The party, in its original form before the 1999 split, had reputable leaders, such as S. R. Bommai, J. H. Patel, M. P. Prakash, and Vaijanath Patil, representing the North Karnataka region. In recent years, especially following the untimely demise of former JDS state president Merajuddin Patel, the party’s representation in North Karnataka has witnessed a qualitative and quantitative decline. Delays in filling the leadership void have relegated the party’s status in the sub-region’s political discourse and inadvertently benefited the BJP and INC.
Reinserting itself into that discourse will require a multipronged strategy, including cadre strengthening and outreach premised on JDS’ historical contributions, including to the Upper Krishna Project (UKP). During his prime ministerial tenure, H. D. Deve Gowda amended the central funding guidelines for irrigation projects, much to the benefit of the UKP and, by extension, the predominantly drought-stricken Kalyana Karnataka region.
Additionally, JDS is well-positioned to blur the boundaries of the sectarianism that entitles INC to the “AHINDA vote bank.” INC’s recent disciplinary action against MLC K Abdul Jabbar and Naseer Ahmed has seemingly drawn the ire of Muslims, who constitute the largest social group within the AHINDA framework. JDS’ reaffirmation of its secular stance could, at the very least, provide an outlet for INC’s dissenters and deserters alike to voice their frustrations.
However, JDS’ revival shouldn’t be about opportunistic defections but a systemic transformation—a Sampoorna Kranti 2.0—that reconciles with the many moving parts of modern politics in Karnataka. Compared to 2023, an estimated 4.5–5 million new voters will be eligible to vote in the 2028 state assembly elections as they attain adulthood, each more receptive to pragmatic policies than to sectarian rhetoric. This calls for JDS to exhibit political prudence that envisages employment opportunities, good urban liveability, and a knowledge-based economy.
While JDS’ advantageous perception in the context of Karnataka’s nativist undercurrent is by design, that alone will not translate to electoral success in 2028. Concerted campaigns and strategies aside, its quest for political resurgence largely hinges on telling unvarnished truths about its renewed vision. Unironically, the rationale for that approach can be derived from none other than Jayaprakash Narayan himself, who, in a sociology paper on cultural variation, wrote⁵: “All quests for social guidance are foredoomed until real knowledge of social change is forthcoming.” Given the current political climate marked by closed-door policies, administrative opacity, and civic apathy, JDS being fully forthcoming about its roadmap would be perceived as revolutionary (kranti) at best and refreshing at worst.
_________________________________________________________________________